THE
Dan Smoot Report

Vol. 11, No. 3 (Broadcast 491) January 18, 1965 Dallas, Texas



DAN SMOOT

WHAT ARE WE DOING IN VIETNAM?

In his State-of-the-Union Message, January 4, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson said:

"Why are we there [Vietnam]?

"We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against communist aggression. Ten years ago, we pledged our help. Three presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it.

"Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression would only increase the danger of a large war.

"Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia."(1)

Let us review our Asian wars in the cause of peace.

On August 8, 1945, six days before the United States forced Japanese surrender, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. On August 9, three Soviet armies moved into Manchuria (Northeastern China, bordering Russia and Korea). Soviet armies stayed in Manchuria less than a year—long enough to dismantle and remove to Russia all modern industrial plants, transportation facilities, and everything else the Soviets could use. During this period, they set up a communist puppet state in North Korea. After stripping Manchuria of about one billion dollars' worth of "war booty," the Soviets armed Chinese communists with captured Japanese equipment (and with American equipment which had been given to Soviet Siberian armies); and they helped communists successfully resist Chinese nationalist forces which Chiang Kai-shek sent to occupy Manchuria as the Soviets withdrew.(2)

From their Manchurian base, Chinese communists intensified their war against Chiang Kai-shek. To weaken United States support for Chiang, communists, and their liberal propagandists in America, claimed they were not real communists, trying to conquer China—but agrarian reformers, merely wanting a fair share of representation in Chiang Kai-shek's government. Knowing communists well, Chiang resisted demands for a coalition government, until George Marshall forced him to comply. The result was communist conquest of China in 1949.(3)

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT, a magazine published every week by The Dan Smoot Report, Inc., mailing address P. O. Box 9538, Lakewood Station, Dallas, Texas 75214; Telephone TAylor 1-2303 (office address 6441 Gaston Avenue). Subscription rates: $10.00 a year, $6.00 for 6 months, $18.00 for two years. For first class mail $12.50 a year; by airmail (including APO and FPO) $14.50 a year. Reprints of specific issues: 1 copy for 25¢; 6 for $1.00; 50 for $5.50; 100 for $10.00—each price for bulk mailing to one person. Add 2% sales tax on all orders originating in Texas for Texas delivery.

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On June 24, 1950, communists attacked South Korea. President Truman sent American troops to drive communists out of Korea, and to unify the nation (north and south) under the anti-communist government of Syngman Rhee. Washington and United Nations officialdom would not, however, let Americans and South Koreans win the war. In July, 1953—after 54,246 Americans had died[4] — President Eisenhower accepted a Korean armistice on terms proposed by "neutralist" India, but virtually dictated by communists.

Trying to restore shattered American prestige, the Eisenhower administration asserted that we had stopped communists in Korea, and that they realized they could conquer no more territory in Asia. The administration was firm about protecting French Indochina from communists.

Indochina is a huge peninsula, projecting southward from the Asian mainland into the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea — comprising Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Those parts of the region which were French colonial possessions were known as French Indochina — and included Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

There had been sporadic, indecisive guerrilla warfare between French and communist forces for years; and we had supported the French with millions of dollars of aid. The Korean war gave an incalculable boost to the morale, prestige, and military strength of communists in Asia. After the Korean armistice, therefore, conditions changed explosively. Communists converted scattered guerrilla action into total war against the French.[5] We continued aid to the French; but on May 7, 1954, the gallant resistance of a small band of French Foreign Legionnaires was broken; and Dienbienphu, the last French stronghold in northern Vietnam fell. Our aid to France was wasted: communists had done what we had promised never to let them do.

In the late summer of 1954, an international conference at Geneva divided the old French Union into four "nations": neutral Cambodia, neutral Laos, neutral South Vietnam, and communist North Vietnam.[6]

An International Control Commission — composed of representatives from Canada, India, and communist Poland — was given the job of supervising the truce agreements. Communists had guerrilla bands throughout the area. Having been given all of North Vietnam, they were supposed to disperse their rebel groups in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam and then to respect the "neutrality" of those three independent nations.[6] They never did disperse their guerrilla bands, but used them to war against the three nations. The International Control Commission ignored, or tacitly approved, communist violations.

In 1955, the Eisenhower administration decided to make its next stand against spreading Asian communism in Laos — a landlocked, primitive, jungle kingdom of about two million people, mostly illiterate. The Laotian economy went on the American dole. We trained, equipped, clothed, housed, fed, and paid the salaries of the Laotian army and of all Laotian police forces; and we directly financed more than 80% of the total civilian budget of the government of Laos.[7]

In December, 1960, our side seemed, at last, to be winning. A strong anti-communist (Prince Boun Oum) was the premier of a new government; and communist forces were driven from Vientiane (capital of the nation) where they had been in control for months. The Soviets suggested an international conference to "settle the trouble in Laos." It was obvious that communists wanted to switch the war for Laos from the battlefield to the conference table — where the anti-communist government of Laos could be forced to form a coalition government with communists.[7]

The United States rejected the Soviet proposal in December, 1960; but on March 23, 1961, President Kennedy reversed the American position. In 1961 and 1962, President Kennedy's special emissary to Laos (W. Averell Harriman) did in Laos what George Marshall had done in China 15 years before — forced the anti-communist government to surrender control to a communist-controlled coalition. By the end of 1962, Laos was virtually a

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communist puppet state — but American aid to Laos continued.[7]

Simultaneously with abandoning the fight against communism in Laos, the Kennedy administration, in early 1962, announced that *the* stand against Asian communism would be made in South Vietnam.[8] All forms of American aid were greatly increased; and thousands of American military personnel were assigned to South Vietnam as advisers, technicians, trainers.

By 1964, our aid to that country had climbed to a total of more than 3 billion dollars; we were continuing to spend an average of one million, 500 thousand dollars a day on our stand against communism there; Secretary of Defense McNamara had promised to *increase* our aid by one million dollars a week; we had sustained *reported* losses of more than 120 Americans killed by enemy action; and American military men and diplomats alike had concluded that the war against communism in South Vietnam could not be won.[9]

Another Strange War

Like the war in Korea, the war in South Vietnam is waged from the American side with self-imposed limitations against *provoking* the principal enemy. Communist guerrillas are trained in communist North Vietnam, by communist China and the Soviet Union. By land and by Soviet airlift, troops and supplies from North Vietnam are moved into Laos. From their safe bases in Laos, communist guerrillas have a choice of hundreds of trails for raids across the border into South Vietnam. They terrorize villages, kidnap peasants for training and service in communist armies, confiscate or destroy supplies and equipment vital to the military and to the civilian population of South Vietnam, kill South Vietnam troops (and, when possible, their American advisers). When they meet opposition, communists retreat along jungle trails to safety, either in "neutral" Cambodia or "neutral" Laos — privileged sanctuaries where American policy will not permit them to be followed, or their supply bases attacked.[10]

Our government will not even permit South Vietnamese to retaliate when they are fired upon from across the Cambodian border.[11]

The United States trains, equips, supplies, and pays the salaries of South Vietnam military forces, and has approximately 22,000 of our own officers and men serving as technicians and advisers, and as operators of American equipment. Often in the thick of combat, Americans are under strict orders from their own government not to fire at the communist enemy, unless they are first fired on. Some of the finest American military officers are assigned to South Vietnam combat forces as advisers; but they can only advise. South Vietnamese officers often ignore American advice, with distastrous results. For example:

"In one operation, 14 American helicopters were damaged; three Americans were killed and 10 were wounded. In that battle, American advisers on the scene pleaded with Vietnamese officers to attack and seize key positions. The Vietnamese were urged to close the ring around the communist guerrillas, to cut off their escape route. The American advice was ignored. At one point, a call for aid asking Vietnamese forces to rescue Americans cut off by the guerrillas went unheeded. This debacle was only one of several in a single week."[10]

South Vietnam commanders seem reluctant to engage the enemy in ground combat — as unwilling to inflict casualties on communist forces as to sustain casualties themselves. Hence, they rely too much on sophisticated American weaponry. The result is that many bombardments of South Vietnam villages, with American planes and weapons, kill more women and children than communist guerrillas.[12]

Note the following remarks by Sol W. Sanders, *U. S. News & World Report* staff member who has covered the jungle war in Vietnam for several years:

"In this war, the Communists always try to push the civilians into your line of fire so that you

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whack a lot of civilians over the head and they join the communists, too."

"Inevitably, the more Americans you have in Vietnam, the more weight it gives to the big argument of the communists—namely, that the Americans have come to Vietnam to replace the French, that they want control of this territory . . . .

"Out in the country, I'm convinced, 80 per cent of the peasantry doesn't care who rules in Saigon [capital of South Vietnam] or Hanoi [capital of communist North Vietnam]. They just want to be left alone. They're tired of being bombed by Government planes, and they're tired of being assassinated by communist terrorists."[11]

There is growing hatred of Americans throughout the rural areas of South Vietnam. One American, a resident of several years, reports that children in the villages — who used to wave happily at Americans — now turn their backs when they see Americans. [13]

The American government's queasiness about "world opinion" has also helped communism and severely damaged the anti-communist fight in South Vietnam.

When the Geneva agreement of 1954 divided Vietnam into communist north and non-communist south, Bao Dai became king of South Vietnam; and Ngo Dinh Diem became premier of his new government. The king and his premier were political enemies. King Bao Dai favored French control of Vietnam; Diem wanted independence. During the summer and early autumn of 1955, Bao Dai and Diem engaged in open conflict. On October 23, 1955, a national referendum was held. Diem received 98 percent of votes cast; and the king was deposed.[14] The American State Department welcomed Diem as the new head of a new "democratic" government, and gave him billions of American tax dollars.[15]

In 1961-62, when the Kennedy administration decided to abandon Laos and make its stand against communism with Diem in South Vietnam, communists (aware of American liberals' attitude about world opinion) launched a campaign to represent Diem as a blood-thirsty dictator hated by his own people. Religious freedom was the pretext and the cover for the campaign.

Nominal Buddhists compose less than a third of the total population of South Vietnam. Church-going (that is, pagoda-going) Buddhists compose about one-half of one percent of the population. Hence, communists tried to inflame Buddhists into resentment against being an "oppressed minority." At the same time, with the help of gullible liberals, communists conveyed to the world the idea that Buddhism was the religion of "the people" in South Vietnam and that Diem was trampling on something sacred to the whole population.[16]

Traditional Buddhists in South Vietnam were not taken in by communist propaganda; but that did not matter. Thich Tri Quang, leader of one Buddhist sect, is a communist. His brother is the head of communist North Vietnam's Ministry of the Interior, in charge of subversion in South Vietnam.[16] Quang prodded a minority of Buddhists to anger against the Diem government — even utilizing an old Buddhist concept of "self-immolation" to move a few fanatics to burn themselves to death in public, in protest against "Diem brutality."[16]

American "liberals" took the communist line and ran wild with it. On April 11, 1962, an ad in *The New York Times* (signed by prominent Americans) denounced the Diem regime for its cruelty. On May 13, 1962, *The New York Times* published an article by Robert Trumbull, criticizing the Diem regime as inept and heavy-handed, hinting that Diem was obstructing the fight against communism, suggesting the possibility of a coup to overthrow Diem. On January 18, 1963, *The Los Angeles Times* published an article by Ted Sell, sharply criticizing the Diem regime, suggesting that many communist guerrillas in South Vietnam were not communists, but merely a part of the "democratic opposition" to Diem. On January 19, 1963, *The Nation* published an article, calling the American-supported Diem war against communism a "dirty, cruel war" which should shock the conscience of the American people. On February 5, 1963, the *Worker* (communist newspaper published in New York) attacked the

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Diem government and demanded withdrawal of U. S. support. And so it went.

Communist-led (or duped) Buddhists staged their first public demonstration against Diem at Hue on May 8, 1963. Diem troops were on hand to prevent violence, but violence occurred. There was an explosion, or gunfire, which killed 9 persons. The Diem government said its troops did not fire—that a communist agent threw a grenade into the crowd. Communists claimed that Diem's soldiers had wantonly fired into the crowd of demonstrators. *The New York Times* story on this event, though giving the Diem interpretation, made it clear that the *Times* believed the communist version.[17]

By August, 1963, Quang (communist leader of a Buddhist sect) had converted many Buddhist pagodas into communist centers of subversion, espionage, and treason against the Diem regime. On August 21, 1963, Diem declared martial law and ordered raids on these communist strongholds.[16]

The U. S. State Department instantly denounced the Diem government for "serious repressive measures" against Buddhists—though the raids were conducted by special police forces trained by, and on the payroll of, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[18]

Henry Cabot Lodge (newly appointed Ambassador to South Vietnam, but not scheduled to arrive there until August 29) rushed to Saigon, arriving on August 22.[19] On August 25, 1963, Lodge asked the CIA to poll Vietnamese generals to see which ones were ready to revolt against Diem.[16]

This action by Lodge was coordinated with a Voice of America broadcast, virtually calling upon the military to overthrow Diem.[16] On August 26, 1963, the Voice of America, in another Asian broadcast, quoted unnamed American officials as saying that the United States government would sharply reduce aid to South Vietnam, unless "officials responsible for the attacks" on Buddhist pagodas were removed. The State Department said the VOA broadcast was "in error"; but VOA did not broadcast a retraction;[18] and the State Department did cut off economic aid for financing imports to South Vietnam—aid which amounted to 95 million dollars a year.[20] On August 28, 1963, a military coup against Diem was attempted, but failed. There is strong evidence that this unsuccessful coup was organized and directed by the U. S. Embassy in Saigon — where Henry Cabot Lodge was in charge.[19, 21]

On September 2, 1963, President Kennedy (in a nationwide television broadcast) sharply criticized the Diem regime for "repressions" of Buddhists, warning that the government of South Vietnam must have a change of policies—and "personnel."[22] *The New York Times* (fiercely opposed to Diem, and friendly to President Kennedy) interpreted Kennedy's remarks as a "virtual invitation to insurrection" against Diem. About a week later, President Kennedy made another statement, somewhat modifying his harsh stand against Diem;[23] but, in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge continued an open vendetta of hatred against Diem.[16]

Lodge, for example, gave sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy to communist Quang and two other "Buddhist monks," whom the Diem government considered dangerous enemy agents — an action which Diem considered final proof that the U. S. and Buddhists were allies in an effort to overthrow the lawful government of South Vietnam.[12, 16]

On September 23, 1963, President Kennedy sent Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell D. Taylor (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to South Vietnam to investigate.[24] On October 3, 1963, McNamara and Taylor reported that Diem's action against Buddhists had not significantly affected the military effort. They said the war against communism was going so well that 1000 American military men could be pulled out of South Vietnam by the end of 1963, and most remaining Americans could be removed by the end of 1965.[25]

Meanwhile, the liberal press was shocking the American public with horror stories about Diem's

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wanton brutalities against innocent Buddhists who wanted nothing but religious freedom. In late October, 1963, a United Nations Fact Finding Mission (created in response to demands by the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN) arrived in South Vietnam to investigate Diem's alleged persecutions.

American military men recognized Diem for what he was: a strong man at the head of a nation whose illiterate peasantry (the bulk of the population) knows nothing and cares less about the meaning of communism or about the civilized idea of fighting for freedom — a nation whose educated people are largely brainwashed with the pro-communist ideas of contemporary liberalism. At war against an enemy that was invading from without and entrenched within, Diem did trample on civil rights — as Abraham Lincoln did during the American Civil War.

We were not helping Diem because we loved him. We were helping him, ostensibly, because the Kennedy administration wanted to make a determined stand against communism in South Vietnam.

American military men (and the CIA, as well) knew that, if our objective *was* to fight communism, we had better stick with Diem, because he was doing a better job than anyone else available.[16] State Department policy, however, was in control at Saigon. Ambassador Lodge conceded that Diem's war against communism was going reasonably well;[16, 23] but Diem was no longer acceptable.

On November 1, 1963, the Diem government was overthrown. President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu (after they had ceased resistance and were under arrest) were murdered.

The Kennedy administration, as *The New York Times* said, "soberly welcomed the coup" against Diem, "recognized its large share of responsibility for the coup,"[23] and acted quickly to recognize (November 7, 1963) the new provisional government of South Vietnam. This opened the way for reinstatement of aid which had been withdrawn from Diem.[26] On November 8, 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that South Vietnam's war against communism would gain impetus from the coup which overthrew Diem.[27]

On December 7, 1963, the United Nations Fact Finding Mission (which had gone to South Vietnam in October to investigate alleged Diem brutalities against Buddhists) made its official report. The UN representatives had interviewed Buddhist monks and students whom the American press had reported murdered by Diem's soldiers; they had found that the suicide burnings had been arranged by a communist "suicide promotion squad," and that the foreign press had always been notified, well in advance, of each public suicide by fire.[28]

On December 23, 1963, this item appeared on the "Washington Whispers" page of *U. S. News & World Report*:

"American officials credited with encouraging the plot to get rid of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother as leaders of South Vietnam now wonder if they were 'taken in' again by the Communists. War in South Vietnam, involving U. S. directly, has been going from bad to worse ever since the Diem family was driven from power and the Diem brothers slain."

In March, 1964, President Johnson sent Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on another mission to find out how the war against communism was going in South Vietnam. On March 17, 1964, the White House released a statement on their findings: "Comparing the situation to last October . . . there have unquestionably been setbacks."[29]

A government under Major General Duong van Minh replaced that of Diem. It was overthrown by Major General Nguyen Khanh. Khanh appears to be genuinely anti-communist. Yet, irritations between him and American officials developed immediately. Note these remarks by Sol W. Sanders:

"This is a civil war in which families are divided . . . . You are never absolutely sure who is on whose side.

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"In this situation, it is extremely naive for Americans to believe that a government can run the country without using secret police or repressive measures on occasion . . . .

"I remember one American official who complained bitterly to me in 1963 that we should not permit the Diem regime to continue using strong-arm methods against Buddhist demonstrators . . . . A few months later, this same American was complaining just as bitterly because the Khanh Government would not discipline the student demonstrators when the whole country seemed to be falling apart . . . .

"Some of my anti-communist friends are saying things like this to me: 'Now you want a strong government. Last year we had one, and you helped bring it down.' "[11]

Further irritants developed in the summer of 1964. Khanh asked for attacks on North Vietnam, because regular army units from the North were infiltrating the South to support communist guerrillas. American officials, refusing to authorize the attacks, denied that North Vietnam units were invading South Vietnam. Khanh felt that American officials were hiding the facts from the public to help President Johnson politically — to keep the United States voters from knowing the truth. He said:

"Johnson had an election to win, but I have a war to win."[11]

On October 26, 1964, Major General Nguyen Khanh resigned to permit formation of a civilian government, with Tran Van Huong as premier.

Buddhists began demonstrations against Tran Van Huong's government, trying to force its downfall, threatening to use the "suicide" tactics of 1963.[30]

Thus ended the year 1964 in Vietnam.

By January 7, 1965, U.S. battle casualties in Vietnam totaled 1788 (1173 for the year 1964, 615 for the previous three years).[31] Vietnamese casualties (North and South) during the same period (1961-1964) have averaged between 1000 and 1500 each month.[11]

On January 3, 1965, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, looking back upon 1964 and anticipating 1965, said the United States would stay in Vietnam on the present basis, neither increasing nor decreasing our participation. He said pulling out would encourage further communist expansion and lead to disaster, but concluded that expanding the war would "multiply casualties by the thousands, subject Asian people to devastation and lead down a trail the end of which no one in any country could possibly see with assurance."[32]

We Must Get Out

We never should have become involved in Asian wars. Once in, however, we should have taken the victory that was in our hands, so that we could depart with honor. We rejected every golden opportunity to do that. At each critical juncture since our involvement in Asia, U. S. political leaders have taken the wrong turn. There is really nothing left for us to do but get out, and improve our own national defenses, to protect our own national interests. Otherwise, inevitably, we will become embroiled in another catastrophic cycle of that East-West war between Europe and Asia which has been raging, one way or another, with intervals of calm, for 1500 years.[33]

How, specifically, should we pull out of Asia? We should give Chiang Kai-shek and the world six-months' notice that we plan to get out and let Asians fight their own wars in their own way. During that interval, we should gather military and civilian goods which we now scatter all over the Far East (to nations which will never use them to fight communism), and divert these supplies to Chiang Kai-shek, giving him our blessing to move with his own men, as he pleases, to rescue China from the communists. If Chiang succeeded, he would destroy the source and center of communist power in Asia.

What if Chiang Kai-shek fails, after we pull out of Asia? One thing we can be sure of: if there are not enough Asians willing and able to

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fight for their own freedom, then Asia cannot be saved. No matter how many American lives our political leaders may be willing to sacrifice in the jungles, deserts, hills, and rice paddies of Asia, we simply do not have enough men to fight Asia's wars for her.

The one remaining strong, determined anti-communist leader in Asia says *he* wants to fight *now.*[34] *Now* is the time.

FOOTNOTES

(1) AP article from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News*, January 5, 1965, Sec. 1, p. 10
(2) *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1961 edition, Volume XVIII, p. 206
(3) "The History of George Catlett Marshall, speech by U. S. Senators Joseph R. McCarthy (Rep., Wisc.), Robert C. Hendrickson (Rep. N. J.), William Langer (Rep., N. D.), and Kenneth S. Wherry (Rep., Neb.), *Congressional Record*, June 14, 1951, pp. 6556-6603 (bound)
(4) "The UN Up To Now—6," *The New York Daily News*, July 8, 1962
(5) *"Bright Spot in Asia,"* by Demaree Bess, *The Saturday Evening Post*, September 15, 1956, pp. 36, 127-8, 130
(6) State Department Publication 7031, November, 1960
(7) For complete documented discussion of Laos, see this *Report*, "The Story of Laos," April 29, 1963, and "Laos—Part I," "Laos—Part II," April 9 and 16, 1962.
(8) *U. S. News & World Report*, August 5, 1963, pp. 46-9
(9) Total aid to Vietnam was $2,214,200,000.00 on June 30, 1962; *U. S. News & World Report* of August 5, 1963, reported that the Kennedy build-up in Vietnam had increased aid to the rate of 1.5 million dollars a day. In a television broadcast on March 29, 1964, Secretary McNamara said (as reported in *The Dallas Morning News*, March 30, 1964) that the new premier of Vietnam plans to conscript 50,000 more men to fight communist guerrillas, and that the United States will give him approximately 1 million dollars a week — in addition to aid already being given — to train and pay salaries of the new conscripts. A wire service story in *The Dallas Morning News* of March 16, 1964, reporting on two American planes shot down in South Vietnam during the weekend of March 14-15, said that the six Americans killed in those incidents brought the total of reported Americans dead to 122. The lead paragraph of a story with a Saigon dateline, written by Dennis Warner and published in *The Dallas Morning News*, March 29, 1964, said: "American military men and diplomats alike, both here and in Washington, have come face to face with the bitter reality of the situation in South Vietnam. Unless a miracle occurs, this war cannot be won."
(10) *U. S. News & World Report*, January 21, 1963, pp. 46-8
(11) "Can U. S. Win In Vietnam? An Inside Report," *U. S. News & World Report*, January 11, 1965, pp. 44-7, 50-2
(12) *U. S. News & World Report*, September 16, 1963, pp. 39-41
(13) *U. S. News & World Report*, March 23, 1964, pp. 50-2
(14) "Biggest Little Man in Asia," by O. K. Armstrong, *The Reader's Digest*, February 2, 1956, pp. 144-8
(15) *The Washington Daily News*, July 20, 1959, pp. 1, 3 and July 21, 1959, pp. 3, 14
(16) "Vietnam—Fact and Fiction," series of articles by Marguerite Higgins from Vietnam, *The New York Herald Tribune*, August 26-30, September 2, 1963; "Saigon Summary: Our Country Played An Inglorious Role In The Final Days Of The Diem Regime," by Marguerite Higgins, *America*, January 4, 1964; all reprinted in *Congressional Record*, January 14, 1964, pp. 328-40 (daily)
(17) *The New York Times*, June 16, 1963, p. 6
(18) UPI dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News*, August 27, 1963, Section 1, p. 9; *The New York Times*, September 9, 1963, p. 1
(19) *Saigon Times*, circa September 1, 1963
(20) *The National Observer*, October 28, 1963, p. 5
(21) "Allen-Scott Report," by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, *The Odessa American*, October 29, 1963
(22) AP dispatch from Hyannis Port, *The Dallas Morning News*, September 3, 1963, Section 1, p. 1
(23) "Optimism Voiced: American Complexity Is Denied—Anxiety Also Expressed," by Max Frankel, *The New York Times*, November 2, 1963, pp. 1, 3
(24) AP dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News*, September 24, 1964, Section 1, p. 1
(25) UPI story, *The Dallas Morning News*, October 3, 1963, Section 1, p. 1; AP story, *The Dallas Times Herald*, October 3, 1963, pp. 1A, 21A
(26) *The New York Times*, November 8, 1963, pp. 1, 9
(27) *The New York Times*, November 9, 1963, pp. 1, 10
(28) *Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission to South Viet-Nam*, published by the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 1964, 324 pp.
(29) *The New York Times*, March 18, 1964, pp. 1, 12
(30) UPI story from Saigon, *The Dallas Morning News*, December 16, 1964, Sec. 1, p. 1
(31) AP article from Saigon by Malcolm W. Browne, *The Dallas Morning News*, January 7, 1965, Sec. 1, p. 3
(32) AP dispatch from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News*, January 4, 1965, Sec. 1, p. 19
(33) For details on conflicts with Asia, see this *Report*, "Our Asian Wars," May 11, 1964
(34) "Chinese Armed Forces Can Recover Mainland," *Free China Weekly*, P. O. Box 337, Taipei, Formosa, Republic of China, December 13, 1964, p. 1

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